The minimum wage and inequality - the effects of education and technology by Barany, Zsofia
The Minimum Wage and Inequality
– The Effects of Education and Technology
Zso´fia L. Ba´ra´ny∗
This version: February 10, 2011
Abstract: While there has been intense debate in the empirical literature about the effects of minimum
wages on inequality in the US, its general equilibrium effects have been given little attention. In or-
der to quantify the full effects of a decreasing minimum wage on inequality, I build a dynamic general
equilibrium model, based on a two-sector growth model where the supply of high-skilled workers and
the direction of technical change are endogenous. I find that a permanent reduction in the minimum
wage leads to an expansion of low-skilled employment, which increases the incentives to acquire skills,
thus changing the composition and size of high-skilled employment. These permanent changes in the
supply of labour alter the investment flow into R&D, thereby decreasing the skill-bias of technology.
The reduction in the minimum wage has spill-over effects on the entire distribution, affecting upper-
tail inequality. Through a calibration exercise, I find that a 30 percent reduction in the real value of the
minimum wage, as in the early 1980s, accounts for 15 percent of the subsequent rise in the skill pre-
mium, 18.5 percent of the increase in overall inequality, 45 percent of the increase in inequality in the
bottom half, and 7 percent of the rise in inequality at the top half of the wage distribution.
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1 Introduction
It is well documented that income inequality has drastically increased in the United States over the
past 30 years along several dimensions.1 Inequality increased between workers with different educa-
tional levels: the college premium increased by 18 percent from 1981 to 2006. The distribution of wages
also widened: the gaps between different percentiles of the wage distribution increased drastically. For
example, in 2006 a worker at the 90th percentile of the wage distribution earned 283 percent more than a
worker at the 10th percentile, whereas this figure was 190 percent in 1981.2 These trends are illustrated
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Wage inequality
Notes: Wages are calculated from CPS May Extracts and MORG supplements. Wages are the exponent of residuals from regress-
ing log hourly wages on age, age squared, sex and race. The skill premium is the ratio of the average high-skilled wage to the
average low-skilled wage. High school drop outs and high school graduates are low-skilled, everyone else is high-skilled.
The changes in the structure of wages fuelled an extensive debate on the forces driving them. One
explanation focuses on changes in labour market institutions, and particularly, on a 30 percent decline
in the real minimum wage that took place in the 1980s, since the biggest changes in wage inequality
took place during this period (DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), Lee (1999), Card and DiNardo
(2002)).
Despite the popularity of this hypothesis, there are, to my knowledge, no attempts in the litera-
ture to quantitatively assess the potential significance of falling minimum wages for wage inequality in
the context of a general equilibrium model. People base their educational decisions on their potential
job opportunities and earnings in different occupations. Hence, in general equilibrium, changes in the
minimum wage could change the educational composition of the labour force at the aggregate level.
Furthermore, the change in the educational composition of the labour force affects the profitability of
R&D differentially across sectors. Therefore, the change in the educational composition of the labour
1See for example Eckstein and Nagypa´l (2004), Goldin and Katz (2007), and Goldin and Katz (2008).
2Calculations from Current Populations Survey (CPS) Merged Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) data for years 1981 and
2006.
1
0.18
0.23
0.28
0.33
0.38
0.43
0.48
0.53
2.2
2.7
3.2
3.7
4.2
4.7
5.2
5.7
6.2
6.7
1973 1978 1983 1988 1993 1998 2003
real minimum wage
minimum wage/average low-skilled wage
minimum wage/average high-skilled wage
Figure 2: The decline in the real minimum wage
Notes: The real hourly minimum wage is the federal minimum wage in 2000$, calculated using the consumer price index (CPI)
from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Average wages are calculated using CPS MORG data. Wages and education
categories are as in Figure 1. The left hand scale is the real value of the minimum wage, while the right hand scale is the ratio of
the minimum wage compared to the average high- and low-skilled wage.
force affects the choices firms make about which sectors to focus their R&D activity on, and this de-
termines the direction of technical change. Thus, through educational decisions, the minimum wage
influences the direction of technical change. Due to the links between minimum wages, education, and
technological change, the quantitative general equilibrium effects of changes in the minimum wage on
inequality could be quite different from what simple partial equilibrium reasoning may suggest.
In this paper, I analyse the general equilibrium impact that lower minimum wages have on inequal-
ity. I consider two channels jointly: educational choices and the skill-bias of technology. I find that
lower minimum wages increase wage inequality. This overall increase is the result of two opposing
forces. On the one hand, the educational and ability composition of the labour force changes, leading to
an increase in inequality. On the other hand, the relative supply of high-skilled labour decreases, which
reduces the skill-bias of technology, and hence inequality.
By building a general equilibrium model with endogenous education and technology, and a binding
minimum wage, this paper bridges two of the most prominent explanations for increasing inequality
in the literature.3 Most of the theoretical literature on skill-biased technical change (SBTC) treats either
technology or labour supply as exogenous. I contribute to this literature by allowing both technology
and relative labour supply to adjust endogenously. I contribute to the literature on labour market insti-
tutions, by proposing a general equilibrium model – with endogenous education and technology – that
allows the full quantitative analysis of the effects of falling minimum wages.
To do this I build on and extend the two sector model of endogenous growth in Acemoglu (1998) by
adding a binding minimum wage and allowing the supply of college graduates to be endogenous. As
3Another prominent explanation for the increasing inequality – that my paper does not relate to – is the increasing openness
to trade, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2004) provide an extensive review of this literature.
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in Acemoglu (1998), the production side is a two sector Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth,
with more R&D spending going towards technologies that are complementary with the more abundant
factor. I explicitly model the labour supply side: workers, who are heterogeneous in their ability and
time cost of education, make educational decisions optimally. I solve for the balanced growth path and
calibrate the model to the US economy in 1981 in order to compare the transitional dynamics with the
observed patterns of wages in the US over the subsequent thirty years.
I find that a decrease in the minimum wage increases the observed skill premium and the wage gaps
between different percentiles of the wage distribution. According to the model, the 30 percent decline
in the minimum wage accounts for about 15 percent of the observed increase in the skill premium in
the US from 1981 to 2006. The fall in the minimum wage also explains almost one fifth of the observed
increase in the 90/10 wage differential, and accounts for about one half of the increase in the 50/10
wage gap. In my model, the minimum wage also has some spill-over effects to the top end of the wage
distribution, explaining 7 percent of the increase in the 90/50 wage gap.
The minimum wage affects inequality through several channels: through changes in the skill com-
position, in the ability composition and in directed technology.
The skill composition of the employed changes. As the minimum wage decreases, low ability work-
ers flow into the low-skilled labour market.4 This increases the skill premium in the short-run, thus in-
creasing the incentives for acquiring education for higher ability workers. However, a lower minimum
wage also makes it easier to find employment, reducing the role of education in avoiding unemploy-
ment. Educational attainment decreases at the lower end of the ability distribution and increases at the
top end.
The ability composition of the labour aggregates changes, due to both the inflow from unemploy-
ment and the changing decision structure of skill acquisition. As the minimum wage decreases, lower
ability workers flow into employment, thereby widening the range of abilities present among the em-
ployed. As both labour aggregates expand, the average ability in both sectors decrease. Since more
low-ability individuals enter the low-skilled labour force, the average ability in the low-skilled sector
decreases more. This composition effect reinforces the initial increase in the observed skill premium.
Finally, the direction of technology reacts to changes in the size of the low- and high-skilled labour
aggregate. The direct effect of the minimum wage – the expansion of the low-skilled labour force –
dominates, decreasing the relative supply of high-skilled labour. This implies that technology becomes
less skill biased in the long run.
4The effects of minimum wages on unemployment are debated in the empirical literature. Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen (1982),
Wellington (1991), Neumark and Wascher (1992) found negative employment effects, while Card (1992), Card and Krueger (1994)
and Machin and Manning (1994) found no or small positive effects. These latter studies are controversial, see exchange between
Neumark and Wascher (2000) and Card and Krueger (2000). Baker, Benjamin, and Stanger (1999) find a negative employment
effect analyzing Canadian data.
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2 Related Literature
The underlying causes of increasing inequality are highly debated among labour economists. There
are two leading explanations, skill-biased technical change (SBTC) and labour market institutions.
Many empirical studies concluded that SBTC is the driving force behind widening earnings inequal-
ity (Katz and Murphy (1992), Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), Krueger (1993), Berman, Bound, and
Griliches (1994), Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998)). This literature stems from the observation that the
relative supply of high-skilled workers and the skill premium can only increase together if the relative
demand for high-skilled workers also increases. 5
Other authors have argued that the unprecedented increase in wage inequality during the 1980s can-
not be explained by skill-biased technical change alone. DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) find that
changes in labour market institutions – namely de-unionization and declining minimum wages – are as
important as supply and demand factors in explaining increasing inequality. Lee (1999) uses regional
variation in federal minimum wages to identify their impact on inequality, and finds that minimum
wages can explain much of the increase in the dispersion at the lower end of the wage distribution.
However, he also finds that the reduction in minimum wages is correlated with rising inequality at the
top end of the wage distribution. This is seen by many as a sign that the correlation between declin-
ing minimum wages and increasing inequality is mostly coincidental (Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008)).
Card and DiNardo (2002) revise evidence for the claim that SBTC caused the rise in wage inequality and
find that this view has difficulties accommodating the stabilization of wage inequality that occurred in
the 1990s.
In the model presented here, the correlation between minimum wages and upper tail inequality is
not coincidental: I provide a theoretical channel through which changes in minimum wages can affect
inequality along the entire wage distribution. I find that minimum wages affect the bottom end of the
wage distribution more, their impact on the top end is significant as well.
In my model, compositional effects play an important role in increasing inequality, as has been doc-
umented in the empirical literature. Lemieux (2006) finds that the compositional effects of the secular
increase in education and experience explain a large fraction of the increased residual inequality. The
study shows that increases in residual inequality and the skill premium do not coincide, implying that
there must be other forces at play besides rising demand for high-skilled workers. Autor, Katz, and
Kearney (2005) argue that even though compositional effects have had a positive impact on wage in-
equality, they mainly affect the lower tail, while the increase in upper tail inequality is mainly due to
increasing wage differentials by education. Autor, Manning, and Smith (2009) assess the effects of min-
imum wages on inequality and find that minimum wages reduce inequality, but to a smaller extent,
and that minimum wages also generate spill-over effects to parts of the wage distribution that are not
directly affected by them.
5Beaudry and Green (2005) find little support for ongoing skill-biased technological progress; in contrast, they show that
changes in the ratio of human capital to physical capital conform to a model of technological adoption following a major change
in technological opportunities.
4
In this study, minimum wages increase educational attainment at the low end of the ability distri-
bution, while reducing educational attainment everywhere else through spill-over effects. In line with
these findings, the empirical evidence on the effects of minimum wages on educational attainment is
mixed. Neumark and Wascher (2003) and Neumark and Nizalova (2007) find that higher minimum
wages reduce educational attainment among the young, and that individuals exposed to higher mini-
mum wages work and earn less than their peers. Sutch (2010) finds that minimum wages induce more
human capital formation.6
Theoretical explanations either rely on exogenous skill-biased technical change or on exogenously
increasing relative supply of high-skilled workers; to my knowledge this is the first paper where both
the bias of technology and skill formation are endogenous.7 Caselli (1999), Galor and Moav (2000) and
A´braha´m (2008) allow for endogenous skill formation and explore the effects of exogenous skill-biased
technical change. Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) develop a general equilibrium model with en-
dogenous skill formation, physical capital accumulation, and heterogeneous human capital to explain
rising wage inequality. In this framework they find that skill-biased technical change explains the pat-
terns of skill premium and overall inequality rather well. Explanations for the skill-bias of technology
rely on exogenous shifts in the relative labour supplies. Acemoglu (1998) and Kiley (1999) use the mar-
ket size effect in research and development, while Krusell, Ohanian, Rı´os-Rull, and Violante (2000) rely
on capital-skill complementarity and an increasing supply of high-skilled labour to account for the path
of the skill premium.
3 The Model
I begin by describing the model’s production technologies, the R&D sector, the demographic struc-
ture and educational choices. Next I define the decentralized equilibrium, and finally, I analyse the
balanced growth path and the transitional dynamics.
3.1 Overview
Time is infinite and discrete, indexed by t = 0, 1, 2... The economy is populated by a continuum
of individuals who survive from one period to the next with probability λ, and in every period a new
generation of measure 1− λ is born. Individuals are heterogeneous in two aspects: in their time cost of
acquiring education and in their innate ability.
In the first period of his life every individual has to decide whether to acquire education or not,
with the time to complete education varying across individuals. Those who acquire education become
6A related debate is on the effects of minimum wages on formal on-the-job training; see, for example, Acemoglu and Pischke
(2003), Acemoglu (2003), Pischke (2005) and Neumark and Wascher (2001).
7My paper more generally connects to the literature on the effects of labour market institutions on investments, which mainly
focus on the differences in the European and American patterns (Beaudry and Green (2003), Alesina and Zeira (2006), Koeniger
and Leonardi (2007)). Another strand of literature that relates to my paper analyses the effects of labour market distortions on
growth and educational attainment, for example Cahuc and Michel (1996) and Ravn and Sorensen (1999).
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high-skilled. In my calibration I identify the high-skilled as having attended college. Those who opt
out from education remain low-skilled. Workers with high and low skills perform different tasks, are
employed in different occupations, and produce different goods. The high-skilled sector includes skill-
intensive occupations and production using high-skilled labour, while the low-skilled sector includes
labour-intensive occupations and production using low-skilled labour. In equilibrium working in the
high-skilled sector provides higher wages and greater protection from unemployment.
The government imposes a minimum wage in every period, and those who would receive a lower
wage – depending on their skill and innate ability – cannot work and become unemployed. As soon as
the minimum wage falls below their marginal productivity, they immediately become employed in the
sector relevant to their skill.
There is a unique final good in this economy, which is used for consumption, the production of
machines, and as an investment in R&D. It is produced by combining the two types of intermediate
goods: one produced by the low- and the other by the high-skilled workers. Intermediate goods are
produced in a perfectly competitive environment by the relevant labour and the machines developed
for them.
Technological progress takes the form of quality improvements of machines that complement a spe-
cific type of labour, either high- or low-skilled. R&D firms can invest in developing new, higher quality
machines. Innovators own a patent for machines and enjoy monopoly profits until it is replaced by a
higher quality machine. There is free entry into the R&D sector, and more investment will be allocated
to developing machines that are complementary with the more abundant labour type.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times: all firms maximize their profits – either in
perfect competition or as a monopoly – and individuals make educational decisions to maximize their
lifetime income. I analyse how a permanent unexpected drop in the minimum wage affects the steady
state and the transitional dynamics within this equilibrium framework.
3.2 Production
The production side of the model is a discrete time version of Acemoglu (1998). It is a two-sector
endogenous growth model, where technological advances feature a market size effect, by which more
R&D investment is allocated to develop machines complementary to the more abundant factor.
3.2.1 Final and intermediate goods
The unique final good is produced in perfect competition by combining the two intermediate goods:
Y =
(
(Y l)ρ + γ(Y h)ρ
) 1
ρ ,
where Yl is the intermediate good produced by the low-skilled workers and Yh is the intermediate
good produced by high-skilled workers. The elasticity of substitution between the two intermediates is
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1/(1− ρ), with ρ ≤ 1. Perfect competition implies that the relative price of the two intermediate goods
is:
p ≡ p
h
pl
= γ
(
Y l
Y h
)1−ρ
. (1)
Normalizing the price of the final good to one implies that the price of intermediate goods can be
expressed as:
pl =
(
1 + γp
ρ
ρ−1
) 1−ρ
ρ
, (2)
ph =
(
p
ρ
1−ρ + γ
) 1−ρ
ρ
. (3)
Intermediate good production is also perfectly competitive in both sectors s ∈ {l, h}. I simplify
notation by allowing a representative firm:
Y s = As(Ns)β for s = {l, h}, (4)
where β ∈ (0, 1), Ns is the amount of effective labour employed and As is the technology level in sector
s.8 Productivity of labour is endogenous and depends on the quantity and quality of machines used.
There is a continuum j ∈ [0, 1] of machines used in sector s. High- and low-skilled workers use different
technologies in the sense that they use a different set of machines. Firms decide the quantity, xs,j of a
machine with quality qs,j to use. The productivity in sector s is given by:
As = 11−β
∫ 1
0
qs,j(xs,j)1−βdj for s ∈ {l, h}.
Notice that even in the short run, productivity is not completely rigid. Productivity, As depends
on the quality of machines and the quantity of each machine used. Producers of intermediate goods
choose the quantity of machines (xs,j) depending on the price and on the supply of effective labour it
complements (Ns).
Since intermediate good production is perfectly competitive, industry demand for machine line j of
quality qs,j and price χs,j is:
Xs,j =
(
psqs,j
χs,j
) 1
β
Ns for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (5)
3.2.2 R&D firms
Technological advances are a discrete time version of Aghion and Howitt (1992). Investment in R&D
produces a random sequence of innovations. Each innovation improves the quality of an existing line
of machine by a fixed factor, q > 1. The Poisson arrival rate of innovations for a firm k that invested zjk
on line j is ηzjk. Denoting the total investments on line j by z
j ≡∑k zjk, the economy wide arrival rate
8See labour supply section for exact definition of Ns.
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of innovations in line j is ηzj . Hence the probability that the quality of line j improves in one period is
(1− e−ηzj ). In Section A.1 of the Appendix I show that the probability that the innovation is performed
by firm k is (1 − e−ηzj )zjk/zj . The cost of investing zjk units in R&D is Bqzjk in terms of final good.
There are two key features to note: one is that the probability of success is increasing and concave in
total investment, zj , the other is that the cost of investment is increasing in the quality of the machine
line. The first feature guarantees the existence of an interior solution, while the second guarantees the
existence of a steady state.
Notice that the probability of success for any single firm depends not only on their own R&D expen-
diture, but also on the total expenditure of other firms. There are many R&D firms, each of them small
enough to take the total R&D spending as given when deciding how much to invest. There is free entry
into the R&D sector: anyone can invest in innovation.
R&D firms with a successful invention have perpetual monopoly rights over the machine they
patented. In Section A.2 of the Appendix I show that if quality improvements are sufficiently large,
then even if the second highest quality machine were sold at marginal cost, firms would prefer to buy
the best quality machine, the leading vintage at the monopoly price. I assume that this condition ap-
plies, therefore the price of the leading vintage in line j and sector s with quality q is:
χs,j = q1−β for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, if quality improvements are large enough, then each machine’s productive life is limited.
Once a higher quality machine is invented producers of intermediate goods switch to using the highest
quality machine.
Monopoly pricing and industry demand (5) yield the following per period profit for the owner of
the leading vintage in line j and sector s:
pis,j = qs,jβ(1− β) 1−ββ (ps) 1βNs for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (6)
The per period profit depends on the price of the intermediate good that the machine produces, and on
the efficiency units of labour that can use the machine. A higher price of the intermediate good and a
higher supply of effective labour, generates a greater demand for the machine. The second component
drives the scale effect in R&D. A higher per period profit means a higher lifetime value from owning a
patent, which implies more investment into improving that machine.
The value of owning the leading vintage is the expected discounted value of all future profits. This
in turn depends on the per period profit and the probability that this quality remains the leading vintage
in the following periods.
The value of owning the leading vintage of quality q in line j and sector s can be expressed as:
V j,st (q) = pi
j,s
t (q) +
1
1+r (e
−ηzj,st (q))V j,st+1(q) for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1]. (7)
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Total R&D spending on line j in sector s of current quality q at time t is zj,st (q), hence e−ηz
j,s
t (q) is the
probability that quality q remains the leading vintage in line j in period t + 1. The present value of
owning the leading vintage of quality q in line j and sector s in period t+ 1 is 11+rV
j,s
t+1(q).
The value of owning a leading vintage is increasing in current period profit and in the continuation
value of owning this vintage. It is decreasing in the amount of R&D spending targeted at improving
quality in this line of machines.
Free entry into the R&D sector implies that all profit opportunities are exhausted. The expected
return from R&D investment has to equal its cost for each firm.
Et(V
s,j
t+1(q
s,j
t ))
1+r (1− e−ηz
j,s
t (q
s,j
t ))
zj,sk
zj,st (q
s,j
t )
= Bqs,jt z
j,s
k for s = {l, h} and j ∈ [0, 1] (8)
The left hand side is the expected return of investing zj,sk in R&D, while the right hand side is the
cost. The expected return depends on the discounted value of owning the leading vintage, and on the
probability that firm k makes a successful innovation. Notice that both the expected return and the
costs are proportional to the R&D investment of firm k. Hence, in equilibrium, only the total amount of
R&D spending targeted at improving line j in sector s is determined.
3.2.3 Technology and Prices
Given monopoly pricing the equilibrium production of intermediate goods is:
Y st = (1− β)
1−2β
β (pst )
1−β
β NstQ
s
t for s = {l, h}. (9)
Where Qst =
∫ 1
0
qj,st dj is the average quality of the leading vintages in sector s. The average quality
evolves according to the R&D targeted at improving the machines:
Qst+1 =
∫ 1
0
qj,st
(
(1− e−ηzj,st (qj,st ))q +
(
e−ηz
j,s
t (q
j,s
t )
))
dj for s = {l, h}. (10)
The growth rate of average quality in sector s is:
gst+1 =
Qst+1
Qst
for s = {l, h}.
Let Qt ≡ Q
h
t
Qlt
denote the relative average quality or relative technology. This evolves according to:
Qt+1 =
ght+1
glt+1
Qht
Qlt
=
ght+1
glt+1
Qt. (11)
Combining (9) with the relative price equation (1) gives:
pt = γ
β
(1−(1−β)ρ)
(
Qht
Qlt
Nht
N lt
)− (1−ρ)β
(1−(1−β)ρ)
. (12)
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Note that the relative price – the price of the intermediate produced by the high-skilled compared to the
one produced by the low-skilled – is decreasing in the relative supply of high-skilled labour and in the
relative quality of the machines used by high-skilled workers. If the relative share of the high-skilled
or the relative quality of the machines that complement them increases, then their production increases
compared to the production of the low-skilled labour. This leads to a fall in the relative price of the
intermediate produced by the high-skilled.
3.3 Labour supply
In this section I describe the labour supply side of the model. I assume that the only reason for
unemployment is productivity below the minimum wage. I further assume that the only incentive for
acquiring education is the higher lifetime earnings it provides. Education increases earnings potentially
through two channels: a higher wage in periods of employment, and better employment opportunities
for high- than for low-skilled individuals. These incentives and the minimum wage determine the
optimal education decision of people, depending on their cost and return to education.
Individuals are heterogeneous in two aspects: in their cost of acquiring education, c and in their
innate ability, a. Let f(c, a) be the joint time invariant distribution of abilities and education costs at
birth.9 The demographic structure is as in Blanchard (1985): every period a new generation of mass
1 − λ is born, while the probability of surviving from period t to t + 1 is λ. These assumptions imply
that both the size of the population and the joint distribution of costs and abilities are constant over
time.
Each individual has to decide whether to acquire education in the first period of his life. Only those
born in period t can enrol to study in period t. Completing education takes a fraction ci of the first
period of individual i’s life, and during this time, he cannot participate in the labour market.10 The time
cost of education is idiosyncratic and is determined at birth. An individual who completes education
becomes high-skilled and has the option of working in the high-skilled sector for life. High-skilled
workers with ability a earn wage wht (a) in period t. Those who choose not to acquire education, remain
low-skilled and can start working in the period they are born as low-skilled. The wage in period t for a
low-skilled worker with ability a is wlt(a).
I model innate ability as a factor that increases individual productivity. Each worker supplies one
unit of raw labour inelastically, which translates to a units of efficiency labour for someone with ability
a.
Using monopoly pricing and the implied demand for machines, the wage can be expressed in terms
of the average quality of machines:
wst (a) = aβ(1− β)
1−2β
β (pst )
1
βQst for s = {l, h}. (13)
9I explain why I introduce heterogeneous time cost in Section 5.2.
10In the calibration exercise I set the length of a period to be five years.
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Since ability is equivalent to efficiency units of labour, it can be separated from other factors determining
the wage. Let wst ≡ β(1 − β)
1−2β
β (pst )
1
βQst denote the wage per efficiency unit of labour in sector s in
period t.
The government imposes a minimum wage wt in every period. Nobody is allowed to earn less
than the minimum wage, hence those with marginal product below the minimum wage in period t are
unemployed in period t. People only remain unemployed while their marginal productivity is below
the minimum wage.
This implies that for both skill levels, there is a cutoff ability in every period below which people
become unemployed. This threshold is:
ast ≡ wtwst for s = {l, h} (14)
Workers with innate ability a ≥ ast work in sector s in period t.11
Individuals choose their education level to maximize the present value of their expected lifetime
utility from consuming the unique final good:
Et
∞∑
j=0
(
λ
1 + r
)j
ut+j
where ut+j is their consumption of the final good, λ is the probability of staying alive until the next
period, r is the discount rate, which is also the interest rate due to linear utility.
Consider the decision of an individual with ability a and cost c born in period t. Denote the expected
present value of lifetime income byWht (a, c) if high-skilled, and byWlt(a, c) if low-skilled; periods of
zero income account for the possibility of unemployment. The optimal decision is then summarized by:
e(a, c)t =
 1 if Wht (a, c) ≥Wlt(a, c)0 if Wht (a, c) <Wlt(a, c) (15)
where e(a, c)t = 1 if the individual acquires education and e(a, c)t = 0 otherwise.
Let d(a)st be an indicator that takes the value one if an individual with skill s and ability a has
marginal product higher than the minimum wage in period t, and zero otherwise. The lifetime earnings
of an educated individual can be expressed as:
Wht (a, c) = a
∞∑
s=1
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wht+sd(a)
h
t+s + a(1− c)wht d(a)ht (16)
Acquiring education takes a fraction, c, of the first period of an individual’s life, implying that he can
only work in the remaining fraction, 1−c, of the first period. The lifetime earnings of a high-skilled indi-
vidual are decreasing in c, the time acquiring education takes him. The more time he spends acquiring
11If the wage per efficiency unit for the high- and the low-skilled were equal, than some high skilled could work in the low-
skilled sector. However, I later show that in equilibrium wht > w
l
t for all t.
11
education, the less time he has to earn money.
The lifetime earnings of a low-skilled individual are:
Wlt(a, c) = a
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wlt+sd(a)
l
t+s (17)
Notice that the lifetime earnings of a low-skilled worker do not depend on c, while the earnings of a
high-skilled worker are decreasing in c. This gives rise to a cutoff rule in c for acquiring education.
Education is worth the investment for an individual with ability a and cost c if Wht (a, c) > W lt (a, c).
As described earlier, there are two channels through which education can increase lifetime earnings:
either the wage per efficiency unit is higher for high-skilled than for low-skilled workers, or being
high-skilled offers greater protection against unemployment. The second case arises when a is such
that awlt < wt < awht , which also requires that wlt < wht . Hence the following remark:
Remark 1. To have high-skilled individuals in a generation born in period t, there has to be at least one period
s ≥ t, such that the wage per efficiency unit of labour is higher for the high-skilled than for the low-skilled:
wls < w
h
s .
This implies that the only reason for acquiring skills is the skill premium, a higher wage per efficiency
unit in the high- than the low-skilled sector. Using the relative price of intermediates, (12) and the wage
per efficiency unit, (13), the skill premium can be expressed as:
wh(a)
wl(a)
= γ
1
1−(1−β)ρ
(
Qh
Ql
)1− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ (Nh
N l
)− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ
.
The above equation shows the ways in which education increases workers’ wages. The first, repre-
sented by γ, arises because goods produced by high- and low-skilled workers are not weighed equally
in final good production. If γ > 1, the high-skilled intermediate contributes more to the final good,
and the overall productivity of the high-skilled, measured in units of final good is greater. The second
source is the different quality machines: Qh is the average quality in the high-skilled, andQl is the aver-
age quality in the low-skilled sector. If technology for the high-skilled is more advanced, then teaching
workers to use these more advanced technologies makes workers more productive. The final source is
decreasing returns in production: if the share of high-skilled workers is very low, their relative marginal
productivity becomes very high.
The labour supply aggregates Nht and N lt are the total amount of high- and low-skilled efficiency
units of labour available in period t:
N lt = (1− λ)
∞∑
j=0
λj
∫ ∞
alt
∫
c
f(a, c)(1− e(a, c)(t−j))d(a)ltdcda (18)
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Nht = (1− λ)
∫∞
aht
∫
c
f(a, c)(1− c)e(a, c)(t−j)d(a)ht dcda (19)
+(1− λ)∑∞j=1 λj ∫∞aht ∫c f(a, c)e(a, c)(t−j)d(a)ht dcda
Recall that high-skilled workers born in period t only work for a fraction (1− c) of period t, since they
spend a fraction c studying.
4 Equilibrium
In this section I define the equilibrium of the economy and show that the steady state is fully character-
ized by two unemployment thresholds and a cutoff time cost for acquiring education. I also show that a
lower minimum wage implies a shift in all three thresholds. These shifts lead to steady state changes in
both the observed skill premium and the overall wage inequality. Inequality is affected mostly through
composition: the ability composition in both skill groups and the skill composition at all percentiles along
the wage distribution are altered.
The economy is in a decentralized equilibrium at all times; that is, all firms maximize profits and all
individuals maximize their lifetime utility given a sequence of minimum wages.
Definition 1. A decentralized equilibrium is a sequence of optimal education decisions {e(a, c)t}∞t=0, cutoff
ability levels {aht , alt}∞t=0, effective labour supplies {Nht , N lt}∞t=0, discounted present values of expected lifetime
income {Wht ,Wlt}∞t=0, intermediate good prices {pht , plt}∞t=0, average qualities {Qht , Qlt}∞t=0, investments into
R&D {zj,ht , zj,lt }∞t=0 and values of owning the leading vintage {V j,ht , V j,lt }∞t=0 for all lines j ∈ [0, 1], where
{Qh0 , Ql0, Nh0 , N l0} and {wt}∞t=0 are given, such that the following conditions are satisfied:
1. the effective labour supplies satisfy (19) and (18)
2. lifetime earnings are as in (16) and (17)
3. the average quality in sector s evolves according to (10)
4. total R&D investment zj,st satisfies (8) for all t ≥ 0 and all j ∈ [0, 1]
5. the sequence {V j,st }∞t=0 satisfies (7)
6. the price sequence {pht , plt}∞t=0 satisfies (2) and the relative price, pt satisfies (12)
7. the optimal education decisions, {e(a, c)t}∞t=0 are as in (15)
8. the cutoff abilities for unemployment, {aht , alt}∞t=0 satisfy (14)
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4.1 Steady State
As is standard in the literature, in this section I focus on steady states or balanced growth paths
(BGP), which are decentralized equilibria, where all variables are constant or grow at a constant rate. In
Section B of the Appendix I solve for the BGP in detail, here I present a more informal discussion.
In the BGP the total R&D spending on all lines within a sector are equal, zj,s∗ = zs∗ for j ∈ [0, 1] and
zs∗ is given by:
β(1− β) 1−ββ (ps∗) 1βNs∗ = Bzs∗ (1+r−e−ηz
s∗
)
1−e−ηzs∗ for s = {l, h}. (20)
The above equation shows that R&D effort in a sector is increasing in the period profit from machine
sales. These profits are higher if the price of the intermediate produced by it, ps∗, is higher, or if more
effective labour, Ns∗, uses this technology.
Along the BGP, relative quality in the two sectors, Q∗, has to be constant, which requires equal R&D
spending in the two sectors: zh∗ = zl∗ = z∗. From (20) R&D spending in the two sectors is equal if:
p∗ =
ph∗
pl∗
=
(
Nh∗
N l∗
)−β
. (21)
Combining the relative price (1),(21) with the intermediate output (9) gives:
Q∗ =
Qh∗
Ql∗
= γ
1
1−ρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
) βρ
1−ρ
. (22)
The above two equations are the key to understanding the dynamics of the skill premium. The skill
premium, which is the ratio of the high- to low-skilled wage per efficiency unit, depends on the relative
price of the intermediates and the relative quality in the two sectors. Since both of these ratios depend
on the relative supply of skills, their interaction determines the effect of relative skill supply on the skill
premium.
Equation (21) shows that the relative price of the two intermediates depends negatively on the rel-
ative supply of high-skilled workers. If there are more high-skilled workers, high-skilled intermediate
production is greater, other things being equal. The technology effect reinforces this, since more R&D is
directed towards the larger sector (from (22)), implying a higher relative quality, Q∗. Intuitively, having
more high-skilled workers and better technologies, leads to more high-skilled intermediate production,
and lowers the relative price of the intermediate.
Equation (22) shows that the relative quality level depends on the relative abundance of the two
types of labour along the balanced growth path. The average quality in the high-skilled sector relative
to the low-skilled sector depends positively on the relative supply of high-skilled workers. With more
high-skilled workers, an innovation in the high-skilled sector is more profitable. Hence technology is
more skill-biased – Q∗ is greater, – if the relative supply of skills is higher.
Note that along the steady state, technological change is not biased towards either sector, the skill-
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bias of technology is constant, since both sectors are growing at the same rate. As pointed out earlier,
total R&D investment in the two sectors is equal, hence the relative quality of the two sectors is constant
along the balanced growth path.
The skill premium per efficiency unit of labour, using (13), is:
wh∗t
wl∗t
=
(
ph∗
pl∗
) 1
β Qh∗t
Ql∗t
= γ
1
1−ρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
) βρ
1−ρ−1
. (23)
The wage per efficiency unit of labour depends on two components: the price of the intermediate good
and the average quality of machines in that sector. Since the relative price depends negatively, while
the relative quality depends positively on the relative supply of skilled workers, the net effect depends
on which influences the wages more.
This ultimately depends on the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediates. If the two
intermediates are highly substitutable, ρ is higher, and relative output affects relative price less; hence
the price effect is smaller. On the other hand, if they are not substitutable and ρ is low, the price effect
is stronger than the quality effect. If (βρ)/(1 − ρ) − 1 > 0, then the skill premium per efficiency unit
of labour is an increasing function of the relative supply of skills. In this case, the increase in relative
quality more than compensates for the decrease in relative price. Hence, an increase in the relative
supply of skills increases the skill premium, implying that technology is strongly biased. If (βρ)/(1 −
ρ) − 1 < 0 then the skill premium per efficiency unit of labour is decreasing in the relative supply, and
technology is weakly biased: the technology effect does not compensate for the price effect.
The skill premium per efficiency unit of labour is not the same as the empirically observed skill
premium. The observed skill premium is the ratio of the average wages:
wh∗t
wl∗t
=
wh∗t
wl∗t
ah∗
al∗
,
where ah∗ is the average ability among the high-skilled and al∗ is the average ability among the low-
skilled.
The skill premium per efficiency unit is constant from (23). From Remark 1, the skill premium has
to be greater than one in at least one period. This implies that wh∗t > wl∗t for all t ≥ 0.
The threshold ability of unemployment for the low-skilled is defined in (14). Combining this with
steady state wages yields:
wt = a
l∗wl∗t = a
l∗β(1− β) 1−2ββ (pl∗) 1βQl∗t . (24)
Note that for the existence of a BGP, it is required that the minimum wage grows at the same rate as the
low-skilled wage per efficiency unit, g∗. Since the growth in average quality is driving wage growth,
let w˜t ≡ wtQlt denote the normalized minimum wage, which has to be constant for a steady state.
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Given al∗, the cutoff ability for the high-skilled is given by:
ah∗ = al∗
wlt
wht
. (25)
As pointed out earlier, the skill premium is greater than one, implying that the threshold ability
for unemployment for the low-skilled is higher than the threshold ability for the high-skilled: ah∗ <
al∗. Acquiring skills through education, for instance learning how to use different machines, increases
workers’ productivity and protects them from unemployment. Acquiring skills allows people with low
ability to increase their marginal productivity above the minimum wage, and to find employment.
In the steady state everyone has a constant employment status: they are either unemployed or em-
ployed in the low- or high-skilled sector. Moreover, depending on their innate ability, a, everyone falls
into one of the following categories: a < ah∗, a ∈ [ah∗, al∗) or a ≥ al∗.
Consider an individual with ability a < ah∗. He does not acquire education in equilibrium because
he would be unemployed regardless of his skills.
Now consider an individual with ability a ∈ [ah∗, al∗). If he does not acquire education, he becomes
unemployed and earns zero income in every period. On the other hand, by completing his studies
he earns the high-skilled wage. Since the opportunity cost of education is zero in this case, acquiring
education to become high-skilled is the optimal decision.
Finally, consider an individual with ability a ≥ al∗, who is always employed regardless of his skill
level. Such an individual acquires education if the present value of his earnings as high-skilled (16)
exceed his present value earnings as low-skilled (17).
Result 1. Every individual with ability a ≥ al∗ born in period t acquires education if his cost c < c∗, where c∗
is the cutoff time cost implicitly defined by:
c∗ =
1− wl∗t
wh∗t
1− g∗λ1+r
(26)
Proof. Combining (15) with (16) and (17) and using that in equilibrium dst+k(a) = 1 for all k ≥ 0, for
s = l, h, and a ≥ al∗, implies that the condition for acquiring education is:
a
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wh∗t+s − a
∞∑
s=0
(
λ
1 + r
)s
wl∗t+s ≥ awh∗t c.
This shows that the optimal education decision is equivalent to a threshold time cost, c∗t . Using the fact
that wages in both sectors grow at a constant rate g∗, and that the skill premium, wh∗t /wl∗t is constant,
c∗t = c
∗ is constant and given by (26).
The threshold time cost for acquiring education and consequently the fraction of high-skilled work-
ers depends positively on the skill premium and on the growth rate of the average qualities. The thresh-
old is increasing in the skill premium, since a higher skill premium implies a greater per period gain
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from working as high-skilled. The growth rate of wages also increases the threshold time cost; if wages
grow at a higher rate, then for a given skill premium, future gains are greater.
-
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Figure 3: Optimal education
Notes: The horizontal axis represents the support of the ability distribution, and the vertical axis represents the support of the
cost distribution.
Figure 3 depicts educational choices in the steady state. Individuals with ability lower than ah∗ are
unemployed and do not acquire education (U ). Between the two thresholds, ah∗ ≤ a < al∗, everyone
acquires education and becomes high-skilled to avoid unemployment. Finally individuals with ability
above al∗ acquire skills if their time cost is below c∗.
The three cutoff values determine the effective labour supplies, Nh∗ and N l∗. In turn, the effective
labour supplies determine every other variable in the economy in steady state. Therefore, the steady
state of the economy is characterized by the three thresholds ah∗, al∗ and c∗. Furthermore, the three
thresholds are also connected through the equilibrium condition (25). This condition relates the two
cutoff values of unemployment through the skill premium.
Lemma 1. The pair (al∗, c∗) uniquely defines ah∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
The balanced growth path is defined by two key equations: the equilibrium c∗ given the threshold
for low-skilled unemployment (26) and the equilibrium al∗ given the cutoff time cost for acquiring
education (24). Figure 4 graphs these two equations.
The curve CC represents the equilibrium c∗ for different values of al (26). The threshold ability for
low-skilled unemployment affects c∗ through two channels. The first is the growth rate: a higher al
decreases the total amount of effective labour in the economy. Due to scale effects in R&D, this reduces
the growth rate of the economy.12 A lower growth rate implies a lower lifetime gain from being high-
skilled, hence a lower c∗.
12See Appendix section B.3 for the exact dependence of the growth rate on the supply of high- and low-skilled effective labour.
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Figure 4: Steady state
The second channel is the skill premium. A higher al reduces N l and increases Nh, so the relative
supply of high-skilled workers increases. A weak technology bias reduces the skill premium, and the
gain from acquiring education; thus, a higher al reduces c∗ both through its affect on growth and on the
skill premium, so the curve represented by CC is downward sloping.
On the other hand if technology is strongly biased, then an increase in Nh/N l increases the skill pre-
mium. The decreasing growth rate pushes c∗ down, while the increasing skill premium pushes c∗ up.
The overall effect on the gain from education can be ambiguous if technology is strongly biased. For
the range of values that are of interest, the overall effect is small and negative.
The curve AA represents the equilibrium unemployment threshold al∗ for different values of c (24).
If c is higher, there are more high-skilled workers, and their production increases. This, in turn, de-
presses the price of their intermediate, ph, while the price of the low-skilled intermediate increases.
A higher pl allows workers with both lower ability and skills to participate in the market. Hence the
threshold for unemployment for the low-skilled is a decreasing function of c, implying the downward
sloping AA curve in Figure 4.
4.2 Lowering the minimum wage
To analyse the effects of minimum wage on inequality, I consider an unanticipated permanent de-
crease in the normalized minimum wage. A lower minimum wage excludes fewer people from the
labour market, by lowering the unemployment threshold for both the high- and the low-skilled. More-
over, through endogenous R&D, the increase in the supply of effective labour raises the growth rate of
the economy, thus increasing the incentives to acquire education, resulting in a higher cutoff cost for
acquiring education. The shift of these three thresholds changes the ability composition in both sectors
and the skill composition along the ability distribution. Average ability in both sectors decreases, with
high-skilled average ability decreasing less. The fraction of high-skilled workers changes at every per-
centile in the wage distribution, increasing at the top end and decreasing at the bottom end, thereby
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increasing overall inequality.
The normalized minimum wage shifts curveAA and leaves curve CC unaffected. From (24) a lower
w˜ implies that a lower al∗ satisfies the equation for any c. Therefore, a higher normalized minimum
wage shifts the curve up, and a lower value shifts the curve down.
Curve BB in Figure 4 represents the equilibrium unemployment threshold al∗ for any cutoff time
cost of education for a lower w˜. The steady state moves from O1 to O2. The new steady state features
a lower threshold for unemployment, al∗1 and a higher threshold for the time cost of education, c∗1. The
effect of these changes on the supply of high- and low-skilled effective labour are depicted in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: Change in the optimal education and labour market participation
Notes: In the graph I represent a case where [ah∗1 , a
l∗
1 ] and [a
h∗
0 , a
l∗
0 ] do not overlap. I chose to show such a case, since this is
what I find in the calibration exercise.
The direct effect of an increase in c∗ is to decrease N l∗ and increase Nh∗. A higher c∗ implies that
more people acquire education for higher wages. The fraction of low-skilled workers decreases while
the fraction of high-skilled increases among those with ability greater than al∗0 .
A lower al∗ entails that fewer people acquire education to avoid unemployment. While previously
everyone with ability, a ∈ [ah∗0 , al∗0 ) became high-skilled to avoid unemployment, now they would be
employed regardless of their skill level. Only those with cost lower than c∗1 acquire education. This
increases N l∗ partly by reducing Nh∗ and partly by reducing unemployment.
A decrease in al∗ also implies a lower ah∗, which increases Nh∗ by reducing unemployment. A
lower unemployment cutoff for the high-skilled shifts down the range of abilities for which people
acquire education to avoid unemployment.
The overall effect of a decrease in the minimum wage on the relative supply of skills depends on the
elasticity of al∗ relative to the elasticity of c∗. The change in the supply of high and low skills governs
the change in the skill premium as well.
In general, the effect of minimum wages on the supply of skills is ambiguous. However, numerical
results suggest that a lower minimum wage increases the supply of high-skilled less than it increases
the supply of low-skilled effective labour, leading to a decrease in the relative supply of skills. The
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calibration exercise presented in Section 5 yields that technology is strongly biased; hence, a reduction
in the supply of skills decreases the skill premium per efficiency unit of labour.
Overall inequality in the economy, measured by the wage gap between different percentiles of the
wage distribution, increases. With a lower minimum wage the range of abilities in the labour market
widens, and the fraction of high-skilled increases at the top end of the ability distribution, and decreases
at the bottom end. These forces both push towards greater inequality.
5 Calibration
I first present estimates of the parameters set outside the model. I then present maximum likelihood
estimates of the ability and time cost of education distributions, based on the equilibrium conditions of
the model. Finally, I calibrate the remaining parameters by globally minimizing the distance between
data moments and steady state moments of the model.
5.1 Interest rate, lifespan and production technology
Three parameters, namely, the share of labour in the production function, β, the interest rate, r, and
the survival probability, λ, can be set outside the model.
The intermediate good is produced by labour and machines, and the exponent on labour is β. This
implies a wage bill of βY in the aggregate economy. Since the wage bill has been roughly constant at 23
over long run US history, I set β = 23 .
The interest rate and the probability of survival depend on the length of a period in the model. Since
people can spend only a fraction of their first period studying in the model, I set one period in the model
to correspond to five years.13
Based on the real interest rate in the US, which has been about five percent annually, I set the interest
rate for five years to be r = 1.055 − 1.
On average, since people spend 45 years working and studying, the rate of survival can be set to
give an expected 9 periods of work, including the period of study.14 This gives the value λ = 1− 19 .
5.2 Ability and cost distribution
Estimating the distribution of abilities and costs is a crucial part of the calibration exercise. Since
ability and the cost of education are not directly observable, I combine equilibrium conditions of the
13A longer model period would also allow for completing education in one period. However, shorter periods provide richer
transitional dynamics.
14The expected lifespan of someone who has a per period survival probability of λ is
E(j) =
∞∑
j=1
jλj−1(1− λ) = 1
1− λ
Solving for E(j) = 9 gives λ = 1− 1
9
.
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model with observable characteristics such as wages, education levels and age to estimate these distri-
butions.
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Figure 6: Hourly wages of the high- and low-skilled in 1981
Notes: Wages are calculated from the CPS MORG supplements. Wages are the exponent of the residuals from regressing log
hourly wage on age, age square, sex and race. Those who attended college are high-skilled, everyone else is low-skilled. The
lines represent the kernel density estimate produced by Stata.
Figure 6, which represents the hourly wages of high- and low-skilled individuals, offers a good
starting point for identifying the ability and cost of education distributions. A striking feature in the
figure is the significant overlap between the wages of the two educational groups. An appropriate
distribution, therefore, must reproduce this pattern.
In general there are two components to the cost of education: a time cost and a consumption cost.
The time cost arises because a person can work part-time at most while studying. The consumption
cost is due to tuition fees and other expenses. Both these costs could be thought of as homogeneous
or heterogeneous across individuals. For example, a model with credit constraints and differential en-
dowments would yield a heterogeneous education cost in reduced form. I consider three cases—a ho-
mogeneous cost, a distribution of consumption costs and finally a distribution of time costs—and show
that only heterogeneous time costs of education can reproduce the overlapping wages.15 Therefore in
the calibration and in the numerical results I assume that the cost of education is purely an idiosyncratic
time cost.
First, consider the case with a homogeneous consumption cost of acquiring education. In this case,
the returns to education are increasing in ability, while the cost is fixed. In equilibrium there is a cutoff
15For sake of brevity in the discussion of the various cases I only consider the decision of those individuals, who acquire
education for higher wages and not to avoid unemployment. In all cases, there would be a range of abilities at the very bottom
end of the ability distribution, where some people would acquire education to avoid unemployment, while the rest would be
unemployed.
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ability above which people acquire education, and below which they do not. Since both ability and
wage per efficiency unit are higher for high-skilled individuals, equilibrium choices imply higher wages
for high-skilled individuals. Wage distributions in this setup would not overlap, contradicting the
empirically observed pattern.16
Second, assuming a distribution of consumption costs does not fit the empirical pattern of over-
lapping wage distributions either. A distribution of consumption costs implies a cutoff cost for every
ability level in equilibrium. Given the cutoff for an ability level, those with the respective ability and
lower cost of education acquire education, while those with cost higher than the cutoff do not. The
equilibrium cutoff cost is increasing in ability: people with higher ability, have higher returns from ed-
ucation and are willing to pay a higher consumption cost for education. This implies that the fraction of
high-skilled is increasing in the ability level, implying a higher average ability among the high-skilled.
As in the previous case, high-skilled individuals have higher wages due to a higher unit wage and
higher average abilities, contradicting the overlapping wage distribution pattern.17
Third, assuming instead, that the cost of education is a time cost, the equilibrium cutoff cost for
acquiring education is independent of ability. If the ability and cost distributions are independent, then
the high-skilled have higher wages only because of higher unit wages, since the average ability in the
two sectors are equal. The distribution of wages for the high-skilled is a shifted and compressed version
of the distribution of wages for the low-skilled. Hence, in this case predictions on the distribution of
wages in the high- and low-skilled sector match well with the pattern observed in Figure 6. Therefore in
the calibration and in the numerical results I assume that the cost of education is purely an idiosyncratic
time cost.
For simplicity I assume that ability and education costs are independently distributed. I assume a
uniform time cost distribution on [0, c], with c ≤ 1, allowing a maximum of five years for studies if
c = 1. The probability density function is g(c) = 1/c. I assume that ability is lognormally distributed,
with probability density function f(a) = 1aσφ(
ln(a)−µ
σ ), where φ is the pdf of the standard normal dis-
tribution.
Since all variables of interest in the steady state calibration and in the quantitative assessment of the
transition are invariant to the mean of the ability distribution, I normalize this mean to be one.18
In the model, the wage of an individual with ability ai and education s is given by ws(ai) = aiws,
while the average wage in sector s is ws = asws, where as is the average ability among those with
16If the homogeneous cost was a time cost, everyone would need to be indifferent between acquiring education or not. Since
both the cost and the returns to education are linearly increasing in ability, if people were not indifferent then either everyone
would acquire education or nobody would. An equilibrium based on indifference cannot be estimated from the data, since the
ability, and therefore the wages of high- and low-skilled individuals are indeterminate in equilibrium.
17This holds even when the ability and cost distributions are independent. With a negative correlation between ability and the
consumption cost of education, the two wage distributions would overlap even less.
18This normalization is equivalent to:
E(a) = eµ+
1
2
σ2 = 1 ⇔ µ = − 1
2
σ2
Furthermore, in any model, where agents are heterogeneous in ability, the mean of the ability distribution and the technology
level are not separable along any observable measure. Since this setup does not require the absolute level of technology, or the
mean of the ability distribution for any quantity of interest, this normalization is without loss of generality.
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education s, and ws is the wage per efficiency unit in sector s. Based on this:
ai
as
=
ws(ai)
ws
≡ a˜si .
An individual’s ability relative to the average ability in his education group is equal to his wage relative
to the average wage in that sector. Since the education and wages of every respondent in the sample
are recorded, I can infer relative ability, a˜si , from the data.
If the distribution of time costs and abilities is known, cutoff values for unemployment, ah∗, al∗ and
time cost c∗ can be found by matching the fractions of unemployed, low- and high-skilled workers.
The thresholds ah∗, al∗ and c∗, and the parameters of the ability and cost distributions are sufficient to
calculate the average ability in both education groups, ah, al (see Figure 3 and Appendix C.1).
Multiplying the relative ability of a person by the average ability in his education group gives his
ability level:
ai =
ai
as
as =
ws(ai)
ws
as.
According to the model, if a high-skilled individual i’s wage is lower than a low-skilled individual’s
wage, and since the skill premium is greater than one, it follows that his ability has to be lower as well.
This implies the following:
ki ≡ arg minj|whi <wlj wlj ahi ≤ alki .
Similarly, the ability of any low-skilled individual has to be higher than the ability of all high-skilled
individuals with a lower wage:
ki ≡ arg maxj|wli>whj whj ali ≥ ahki .
A high-skilled individual has wage whi if his ability is a
h
i =
whi
wh
ah, and he acquired education either to
avoid unemployment, or because his time cost is lower than the threshold, ci ≤ c∗. If he is in the first
period of his life, his time cost of education must be lower than the maximum amount of time he could
have spent studying. The probability of observing a high-skilled individal with wage whi at age d is:
P (whi , h, d) =

P (a = ahi ) if a
h
i ∈ [ah∗, al∗) & d ≥ 23
P (a = ahi )P (c ≤ d−185 ) if ahi ∈ [ah∗, al∗) & d < 23
P (a = ahi )P (ci < c
∗) if ahi ≥ al∗ & d ≥ 23
P (a = ahi )P (ci < min{c∗, d−185 }) if ahi ≥ al∗ & d < 23
Since there is an upper bound on the ability a high-skilled individual can have, the likelihood of ob-
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serving a given wage, whi for a high-skilled person can be written as:
L(whi , d;σ, c) =

0 if ahi < a
h∗ or ahi > a
l
ki
f(ahi ) if a
h
i ∈ [ah∗, al∗) & ahi ≤ alki & d ≥ 23
f(ahi )G(
d−18
5 ) if a
h
i ∈ [ah∗, al∗) & ahi ≤ alki & d < 23
f(ahi )G(c
∗) if ahi ≥ al∗ & ahi ≤ alki & d ≥ 23
f(ahi )G(min{c∗, d−185 }) if ahi ≥ al∗ & ahi ≤ alki & d < 23
(27)
Similarly, a low-skilled individual earning wage wli must have a
l
i =
wli
wl
al, and cost exceeding the cutoff
time cost; ali ≥ ahki must also hold. The probability of observing wli is then:
P (wli, l) = P
(
a = ali
)
P (ci ≥ c∗).
The likelihood of observing wage wli for a low-skilled individual is:
L(wli;σ, c) =
 0 if ali < al∗ or ali < ahkif(ali)(1−G(c∗)) if ali ≥ al∗ & ali ≥ ahki (28)
I calculate the likelihood of observing the sample of wage and education pairs using (27) and (28). I
maximise the likelihood by choosing parameters σ and c.
I use the May and Outgoing Rotation Group supplements of the Current Population Survey for
1981. I choose 1981 as the initial steady state because from 1982 onwards, the minimum wage was
not adjusted by inflation, and its real value started declining. I divide the population into high- and
low-skilled based on college education: those who attended college are high-skilled, those who did not
are low-skilled. I calculate the fraction of unemployed, low-skilled and high-skilled workers using the
education and the employment status categories .19 In order to capture only the effects of education
and underlying ability, I use a cleaned measure of wage. This measure is the exponent of the residuals
generated from regressing log hourly wages on age, age square, sex and race.
The maximum likelihood yields σ = 0.73 and c = 0.82, which corresponds to about four years.
5.3 Final good production and R&D
I calibrate the remaining parameters to minimize the distance between moments of the initial steady
state and the same moments from the data. It is common in calibration exercises to match n moments
exactly by choosing n parameters, and use the remaining moments to test the goodness of fit of the
model. In this method the parameters chosen depend heavily on which moments are matched, and
the choice of these moments are rather arbitrary. The method I use, which is similar to a method of
moments estimation, is to choose the values of 6 parameters to minimize the weighted distance from
19In the calibration I do not make a distinction in the educational attainment of the unemployed. In the steady state, only those
who will be employed in the future should acquire education. In the data, half of the unemployed have some college education.
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Table 1: Moments
Moment Data Model
Lu 0.0693 0.1023
Ll 0.5338 0.4923
Lh 0.3554 0.3964
g 0.0800 0.0798
wh/wl 1.3344 1.0518
w/w50 1.1072 1.2942
w90/w50 1.7060 2.4252
w50/w10 1.7006 2.0778
wh/w 1.1796 1.0280
9 moments of the data. The weight of the ith moment, is the estimated standard deviation of the ith
moment in the data. I run a grid search over the set of parameter values and find the set that globally
minimizes the distance from the moments.
I chose three types of moments: moments that describe the skill-composition and fraction of unem-
ployed in the economy, those that describe the wage distribution, and those that reflect the R&D process.
Moments of the first type are important to match, as most of the movement in the model comes from
changes in these aggregates. The second type is also crucial, since I analyse the effects of minimum
wages on inequality. Finally, matching the growth rate, which is governed by the R&D process, deter-
mines the responsiveness of technology. The moments and the fit of the model are summarized in the
Table 1.
I globally minimize the distance from the data moments by choosing ρ, γ, η, q, B and w˜. The cal-
ibrated parameters are summarized in Table 2. Parameters η and B control the profitability of R&D
activity, while q, η andB together determine the growth rates. Parameter η determines how much R&D
spending increases the Poisson arrival rate of innovations, while parameter B determines how costly
R&D investments are in terms of the final good. The value of q determines the size of the improvement
between two quality levels over a five year period. The weight of the high-skilled intermediate in the
production of the final good is given by γ.
Table 2: Calibrated parameters
ρ γ η q B w˜ β λ r c σ
0.9 1.15 0.25 2.08 0.15 0.4 2/3 8/9 1.055 0.82 0.73
Parameter ρ controls the elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods produced by the
high- and low-skilled. This elasticity, 1/(1−ρ) cannot be estimated directly from the data. Note that the
elasticity of substitution between the intermediate goods is not the same as the elasticity of substitution
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between high- and low-skilled workers, which has been estimated by several authors. However, their
estimates are not comparable to ρ, since technology is usually modelled as exogenous, while in my
model it is endogenous.20
6 Transitional Dynamics
In this section I discuss the transitional dynamics following a reduction in the minimum wage. The
transition takes relatively long as new generations have to replace older ones, as the new steady state
features a different educational composition. During the transition, the average skill premium and the
wage gaps between different percentiles in the wage distribution all increase. The increase is the most
pronounced in the period of the announcement, due to the entry of previously unemployed workers
into the labour force. Inequality measured by the skill premium and wage gaps continues to increase
throughout the transition, as both the skill composition of the labour force and the ability composition
of the two skill groups change.
Initially the economy is in steady state. The minimum wage grows at the same rate as the wages and
the quality in both sectors. The government unexpectedly announces a permanent decrease in the value
of the normalized minimum wage. The normalized minimum wage drops to its new lower value in the
period of the announcement, and stays there forever. Individuals and R&D firms have perfect foresight
over the future sequence of the minimum wage, and form correct expectations about the future path of
the average quality levels of machines and education acquisition of future generations. The economy is
in a decentralized equilibrium along the transitional path from the initial BGP to the new one.
I use a second order approximation of the equations that have to hold throughout the transition to
produce the transitional dynamics (see Appendix section D for details).21
Figure 2 shows that the real value of the minimum wage decreased by about 30 percent until the
late 1980s, while the minimum wage compared to the average high- and low-skilled wage decreased
by about 20 percent. In the transitional dynamics I mimic this pattern by a one-time 20 percent drop
in the value of the normalized minimum wage. Since in the steady state the real minimum wage is not
stationary, it is not possible to simulate a shock by changing its value while using perturbation methods.
The change in the normalized minimum wage is not necessarily the same as the change in the minimum
wage compared to the average wage, but the transition shows that it is sufficiently close.22
20See Section C.2 of the Appendix for further details.
21I use the code designed in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004) to produce the transitional dynamics.
22Using the normalized minimum wage implies:
w˜1 ≡ wt
Qlt
= altβ(1− β)
1−2β
β (plt)
1
β ,
while using the minimum wage compared to the average low-skilled wage implies:
w˜2 ≡ wt
wlt
= alta
l
t.
These clearly do not imply the same dynamics for alt, but since the magnitude of the change in both p
l
t and a
l
t is small, their effect
will be dominated by the drop in w˜ throughout the transition.
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Figure 7: Transition of the main variables
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Figure 7 shows the transitional path from the original steady state to the new one, which features
a 20 percent lower normalized minimum wage. The horizontal axis denotes the year, with the drop in
the normalized minimum wage occurring in 1981.
The top two panels in Figure 7 show the path of the unemployment thresholds. At the moment of
the announcement, both ah∗ and al∗ drop almost to their new steady state value. It is not visible on
the graphs, but the threshold ability for low-skilled unemployment initially stays above its steady state
value and gradually falls towards it, while the threshold for high-skilled unemployment drops slightly
below, then increases to its new steady state value. Equation (24) shows that only the price of the low-
skilled intermediate affects the path of al. As the bottom left panel of Figure 7 shows, the change in the
steady state price is very small, which explains the seemingly immediate jump of al to its new steady
state value. The movement of ah can be understood from (25): ah follows alwlt/wht , therefore the initial
overshooting of the skill premium (second row, right panel in Figure 7) explains the undershooting of
ah. The thresholds for unemployment do not change much after the initial drop because intermediate
prices and the skill premium do not change much either.
Note that the new value of al∗ is lower than the initial ah∗; this suggests that those who acquire
education in order to avoid unemployment in the new steady state and during the transition have
lower ability than those who did the same in the previous steady state.
The path of the cutoff time cost for acquiring education is shown in the left panel in the second row
of Figure 7. This threshold c∗ initially overshoots and then decreases monotonically towards its new
steady state value, which is higher than the original one. This pattern can be understood by looking at
the path of the skill premium (second row, right panel) and the path of the growth rates (bottom right
panel). The initial jump in the skill premium drives the overshooting of c∗, then as the skill premium
decreases, so does c∗. The monotone increase in the growth rate increases the present value gain of
being high-skilled for a given skill premium, which keeps the new steady state value of c∗ above the
initial one.
Taking the path of the three cutoffs ah∗, al∗ and c∗ as given, the paths of the effective supply of high-
and low-skilled labour (depicted in row 4 of Figure 7) can be understood. Figure 8 plots the effect of
changes in the cutoffs on the high- and low-skilled effective labour supply and on the labour market
participation of individuals. The initial steady state thresholds are denoted by al∗0 , ah∗0 , c∗0, while the
new steady state values are denoted by al∗1 , ah∗1 , c∗1. The maximum value of c∗, which is reached in the
period of the announcement is denoted by c∗max.
The shift in the cutoffs lead to two types of changes: in the education decisions and in the labour
force participation of individuals. These mostly affect the new generations: those born in the period of
the announcement, and in subsequent generations. This is because the option of acquiring education
is only available at birth, and individuals are not allowed to retrain themselves in later periods. Thus,
the labour supplies adjust gradually, as new generations replace old ones, lengthening the transition
period.
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Figure 8: Change in the optimal education and labour market participation
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maximum threshold time cost that is reached in the period of the announcement by c∗max.
The only case where this is not true is for members of previous generations (for example personC,D
orD′)with ability between al∗1 and ah∗0 . They are low-skilled and have been unemployed until now, but
in the period of the announcement they can immediately start working as low-skilled workers. Their
entry into the workforce instantaneously increases the supply of low-skilled workers, which is reflected
by the jump in N l.
Members of the new generation with ability between al∗1 and ah∗0 either start working as low-skilled,
as C, or enrol in education at birth, as person D or D′. People with the same time cost as D′ will only
become high-skilled if they belong to generations born close to the initial shock, whereas people with
time cost as D become high-skilled regardless of the generation they are born in. This implies that
the initial increase in low-skilled labour supply will be diminished to some extent in future periods,
as individuals similar to D become high-skilled instead of working as low-skilled. They replace some
members of the older generations who went from unemployment into the low-skilled workforce. The
education of individuals likeD increases the supply of high-skilled workers while decreasing the supply
of low-skilled workers gradually. This is reflected by the gradual increase in Nh.
Consider person E from one of the new generations. He would have been unemployed under
the previous regime, but now can avoid unemployment by becoming high-skilled. This is true for all
members with ability in [ah∗1 , al∗1 ) in the new generations. The entry of these individuals leads to a
gradual increase in Nh.
Individuals similar to A and A′ would have been high-skilled with the original, higher minimum
wage in order to avoid unemployment. Under the new, lower minimum wage, they can work without
acquiring education. Initially only individuals with time cost as high as A remain low-skilled. Grad-
ually as c∗ decreases to c∗1 individuals with time cost as A′ also opt out from education. The change
in the education of individuals with ability in [ah∗0 , al∗0 ) and high enough education time cost gradually
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increases the supply of low-skilled workers at the expense of the high-skilled workforce, reflected in
the gradual increase in N l.
Since the cutoff time cost initially overshoots and then decreases monotonically to its new steady
state value, in generations closer to the announcement, more individuals become high-skilled among
those with ability greater than al∗1 . Consider individual B′. If born in the period of the announcement,
he acquires education. In the long run, however, it will only be individuals with time cost as B whose
education choice is different from the choice of generations born before the change in the minimum
wage. This implies that initially individuals with higher time cost acquire education than the new
steady state implies. The education of these individuals gradually increases the supply of the high-
skilled workforce.
The left panel in row 3 of Figure 7 shows the overall effect of these changes on the relative supply
of skills, Nh/N l: the relative supply of skills decreases on impact. This is the result of two forces. First
there is mass entry from unemployment into the low-skilled labour force at the time of the announce-
ment.The effect of this can be seen on the right panel in row 4 as N l jumps up. Second, there is entry
from unemployment into the high-skilled labour force, but the effect of this is offset to some extent by
the exit of some ability levels, Nh initially increases only slightly (left panel in row 4).
As time passes the effect of the initial increase in the supply of low-skilled workers is diminished,
the relative supply of high-skilled workers starts increasing more, and growth in the supply of low-
skilled workers decreases. Row 4 of Figure 7 shows that both supplies increase gradually, and both
measures rise above their initial level in the long run.
The skill premium per efficiency unit depends on two factors along the transitions: the relative
supply of high-skilled workers and the relative technology available. The interaction of the two is
shown in the right panel of row 2 in Figure 7: on impact the skill premium increases. The initial decline
in the relative supply of skills increases the skill premium. This supply effect is not offset by technology,
as depicted in the right panel in row 3. Even though technology becomes less biased towards the high-
skilled workers in the long run, in the short run it does not have sufficient time to react to these changes.
As the change in the relative supply is unanticipated, technology can only adjust from the next period
onwards. This explains the initial increase in both the skill premium per efficiency unit of labour (right
panel in row 2), and the average skill premium (top panel of Figure 9).
From the second period on, technology adapts according to the change in relative supplies, shown
on the right panel in row 3. It reacts with a lag to the initial decline in relative supply by undershooting,
and then gradually increasing to its new steady state value, which is slightly below the original steady
state. As technology starts to react to the change in relative supply, the skill premium drops as well,
undershooting its final steady state value. In the long run the skill premium converges to its new steady
state value, which is slightly lower than its initial value.
The variables with empirically observable counterparts are the relative supply of high- and low-
skilled raw labour, Lh/Ll, and the average skill premium, wh/wl. The relative raw labour supply is
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Figure 9: Average skill premium and relative raw labour supply
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the year to which I am comparing the results to. The top panel represents the
change in the observed skill premium compared to its initial value, while the bottom panel shows the path of the relative supply
of raw high-skilled labour.
shown in the bottom panel of Figure 9. Its path is very similar to that of the effective labour supply,
but the magnitude of change is quite different. This difference in magnitude is due to the difference
in ability between those who join the low-skilled and the high-skilled labour market. The measure of
people joining the low-skilled workforce is much larger than the measure of those joining the high-
skilled workforce, reflected in the significant overall decline in the relative supply of raw high-skilled
labour. On the other hand, the average ability of those joining the high-skilled workforce is higher
than the average of those joining the low-skilled. This is demonstrated by the only slight long run
decline in the relative supply of high-skilled effective labour. This implies that compositional changes
play an important role in both the high-skilled and the low-skilled workforce. The average ability in
both sectors decreases, but it decreases relatively more among the low-skilled than among the high-
skilled workers.
The top panel in Figure 9 represents the change in the observed skill premium compared to its
initial value. The observed skill premium increases on impact and then decreases gradually, as does the
skill premium per efficiency unit of labour. However, unlike the skill premium per efficiency unit, the
average skill premium converges to a value higher than its initial value in the long-run. This is due to
compositional effects: since the average ability in the low-skilled labour force decreases more than in the
high-skilled labour force, the average skill premium increases relative to its initial value.
Between 1981 and 2006 the average skill premium increased by 18 percent (see Figure 1). In the
model, twenty five years after the decline in the minimum wage (at the dashed vertical line), the increase
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is 2.7 percent, implying that the minimum wage accounts for 15 percent of the increase in the observed
skill premium.
The widening wage inequality is well captured by the increasing gap between the wages of work-
ers in the 90th, 50th and 10th percentile. Figure 10 shows the change in these measures during the
transition. The dashed vertical line represents the year 2006.
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Figure 10: Wage gaps during the transition
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the year to which I am comparing the results to.
These wage gaps increase due to two factors: changes in the skill premium per efficiency unit, and
compositional effects.
Changes in the skill premium only increase inequality in the period of the announcement; from
the third period onwards these changes compress the wage distribution (see Figure 7 second row right
panel).
Compositional forces always put an upward pressure on inequality. One component is the widening
range of abilities present on the labour market. As the normalized minimum wage drops, the threshold
abilities for unemployment decrease, increasing the range of abilities present on the labour market.
As the range of abilities widens, the gap between the ability level at the 90th percentile gets further
away from the ability level at the 50th percentile, which gets further from the 10th percentile. The
second component is the changing ratio of high- to low-skilled workers at every percentile in the wage
distribution. The fraction of high-skilled workers among the top 10 percent of earners increases, while
their ratio at the bottom 10 percent decreases.
All three wage gaps increase the most in the period of the announcement, since the skill premium
and the compositional effects both put an upward pressure on them in this period. After the first period,
the wage gaps widen further, but at a slower rate. The 90/10 wage differential increases the most, while
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the 90/50 increases the least. This is expected, since most of the compositional changes affect the lower
end of the wage distribution.
Note, however, that the the change in the minimum wage causes the top end of the wage distribution
to widen as well. This is mostly due to the compositional changes both in ability and in skill levels,
which affect the position of the 90th percentile and the 50th percentile eraner differentially.
The 90/10 wage gap increased by 32 percent between 1981 and 2006, the 90/50 wage gap increased
by 21 percent, and the 50/10 wage gap increased by 10 percent (see Figure 1). The model is most
successful at predicting the 50/10 wage gap - it explains about 45 percent of the observed increase,
while it explains about 18.5 percent and 7 percent of the increase in the 90/10 and 90/50 wage gaps,
respectively.
7 Decomposition
I consider three simplified versions of the model, in order to better understand the contributions of
changing technology and education to the effects of minimum wages on the patterns of wage inequality.
The first version is one where both educational attainment and technology are fixed. In the second
version, the skill composition is endogenous, but technology is fixed. The third version features fixed
educational attainment and endogenously directed technical change.
Comparing the transitional dynamics of the four models quantitatively shows that most of the initial
effects are due to the inflow from unemployment into the labour market. The decomposition shows that
in the case of endogenous education, compositional effects play an important role, and that the change
in technology does not have a quantitatively big impact on overall inequality.
7.1 Exogenous education, exogenous technology
Consider a model, where the production side is as in the model, but technology and education are
fixed. Technology in the low- and the high-skilled sector is growing at the same rate. There are high
and low-skilled individuals, but the choice of acquiring education is fixed in other words, nobody can
acquire additional education and nobody can opt out from education. I assume that the education and
employment structure in the initial steady state is as in the full model.
If both education and technology are fixed, then lowering the minimum wage affects the wage
distribution only through an expansion of low-skilled employment. A lower minimum wage allows
people who have been previously unemployed, and are hence low-skilled, to enter the low-skilled
labour market (see section E.1 of the Appendix). With constant technology, this decreases the wage per
unit of efficiency for the low-skilled, thereby increasing the skill premium. However, since education is
fixed, this does not translate into an increase in the supply of high-skilled labour. The average ability
in the low-skilled sector decreases, hence the observed skill premium increases more than the skill
premium per efficiency unit.
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In this setup there are no transitional dynamics, as low-skilled employment expands in the period
of the announcement, the skill-premium responds, and there are no further adjustments. As a conse-
quence of a fall in the minimum wage, the supply of low-skilled labour increases, the skill premium
increases and wage gaps between different percentiles of the distribution also increase.
7.2 Endogenous education, exogenous technology
Now consider a model where educational choices are made optimally, but technology is fixed. As
in the previous model, quality in the high- and the low-skilled sector is growing at the same rate. Since
education changes endogenously, I model the labour market side exactly as in the full model. The key
difference is that since growth is exogenous, there is no feedback from the effective labour supplies
to the direction and rate of technological improvements. Therefore, the relative supply of skills only
affects the skill premium through the price effect, as the market size effect is removed. Hence, in this
setup, the skill premium per efficiency unit is always decreasing in the relative supply of skills:
wh
wl
= γ
1
1−ρ+βρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
)− 1−ρ1−ρ+βρ (Qh
Ql
) βρ
1−ρ+βρ
.
The unemployment cutoffs and the threshold for acquiring education are determined exactly as in
the full model (see Appendix section E.2 for details). The only differences are that the skill premium
is always decreasing in the relative supply (see equation above) and the growth rate is exogenous and
independent of the relative supply of skills.
In the Section E.2 of the Appendix, I show that the system can be reduced to two thresholds, al∗
and c∗, as in the full model, and the two equations defining the steady state are as in Figure 5. This
also implies that as in the full model, a reduction in the minimum wage reduces the unemployment
threshold in both sectors, and increases the threshold cost of acquiring education.
In the long-run, the supply of high- and low-skilled effective labour increases, with the relative
supply of skills decreasing. This implies an increase in the skill premium per efficiency unit, unlike in
the full model. Moreover, the average ability in the low skilled sector decreases more, which implies
that the observed skill premium increases more that the skill premium per efficiency unit. The wage
gaps between different percentiles also increase.
The transition takes a long time, as in the full model, since complete educational adjustment takes
several generations.
7.3 Exogenous education, endogenous technology
Finally, consider an economy where education is fixed, but technology changes endogenously. In
such a setup, a lower minimum wage increases the supply of low-skilled labour, thus increasing the skill
premium. This does not lead to an increase in the supply of skills, as educational choices are fixed. The
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average ability in the low-skilled sector decreases, implying that the observed skill premium increases
more than the skill premium per efficiency unit.
Transition takes time, as technology needs to adapt to the new relative labour supplies. In the
long-run, technology becomes less skill-biased and the skill premium per efficiency unit falls below its
original value.
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Figure 11: The role of education and technology in the average skill premium
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, which is the final year, to which I am comparing the results. The colours
represent: blue – full model, red – exogenous technology, endogenous education, green – endogenous technology, exogenous
education, black – exogenous technology, exogenous education.
7.4 Decomposition results
Figures 11 and 12 show the path of the observed skill premium and wage gaps between different
percentiles in the distribution. The observed skill premium increases the most in the case of fixed
education and technology, both in the short- and the long-run. This is not true for the wage gaps:
the wage gaps in the short-run increase the most in the case of fixed education and technology, but in
the long-run, the effects are bigger when education is endogenous. The different pattern of the skill
premium and the wage gaps suggest that the increase in the observed skill premium is driven by the
expanding employment of the low-skilled.
The observed skill premium increases the most in the case of exogenous technology and exogenous
education (see Figure 11), as the increase in the supply of low-skilled labour is the largest. With en-
dogenous technology, the initial impact is the same, but is diminished in the long-run as technologies
become less skill-biased. When education is endogenous, the initial impact of lowering the minimum
wage is smaller. This is due to an expansion of high-skilled employment. As low-skilled workers en-
ter the labour market and the skill premium increases, the incentives for acquiring education increase,
leading to an expansion of the high-skilled labour force, thus diminishing the initial increase in the skill
premium. The initial increase in the skill premium is larger when technology is endogenous, due to the
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Figure 12: The role of education and technology in the wage gaps
Notes: The vertical dashed line represents 2006, the final year of data. The colours represent: blue – full model, red – exoge-
nous technology, endogenous education, green – endogenous technology, exogenous education, black – exogenous technology,
exogenous education.
higher growth rate of the economy. An expansion of the labour force leads to a higher growth rate in
case of endogenous technology, which implies a higher lifetime gain from working in the high-skilled
sector. Therefore, if technology is endogenous, the cutoff time cost for education increases more, leading
to a larger change in average abilities and larger compositional effects.
Figure 12 shows the patterns of wage gaps. In all three graphs, the biggest initial impact is in the
case of exogenous education, implying that most of the initial increase is due to the inflow of previously
unemployed workers into the low-skilled labour market. In the long-run, the wage gaps increase the
most in the case of endogenous education, suggesting that compositional effects play a significant role
in the widening dispersion of wages.
8 Concluding Remarks
There has been much debate about the contribution of the falling minimum wage to the widening
wage inequality in the US. The real value of the minimum wage eroded over the 1980s, losing 30 percent
of its initial value. At the same time - in the early 1980s - there was an unprecedented surge in inequality.
The wage gap widened between any two points in the wage distribution, and the college premium
increased sharply. However, to my knowledge, there are no attempts in the literature to assess the
quantitative significance of falling minimum wages for wage inequality in the context of a general
equilibrium model.
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In this paper I propose a general equilibrium model to analyse the effects of a permanent decrease
in the value of the minimum wage on inequality. This model incorporates minimum wages, endoge-
nous educational choices and endogenous technological progress. All these components are relevant
in their own right: minimum wages affect the educational decisions of individuals through their effect
on job and earning opportunities; educational decisions shape the skill composition of the labour force
and the ability composition of different skill groups; the supply of high- and low-skilled labour affects
the direction of technological change and the direction of technological change affects the educational
decision of individuals.
The analysis in general equilibrium reveals that a reduction in the minimum wage affects overall in-
equality through three channels. First, a reduction in the minimum wage widens the range of abilities
present on the labour market, thereby increasing the difference between any two percentiles in the dis-
tribution. Second, it differentially affects the shares of high- and low-skilled workers at every percentile
in the wage distribution, thus increasing overall inequality. A third channel is the reduction in the skill
premium per efficiency unit, which reduces inequality. Therefore, a reduction in the minimum wage
affects inequality at the top end of the wage distribution, even if only to a smaller extent.
The full effects of minimum wage reductions are only realized in the long run. Minimum wages
affect the educational decisions of individuals in successive cohorts. New cohorts have to replace old
ones for the new equilibrium to be reached. Through considering three simplified models, I show that
the initial and highest increase in all measures of inequality is due to the inflow from unemployment
in the period of the announcement. After this period, the observed skill premium contracts, while the
widening of the wage distribution continues due to compositional changes in both ability and skills.
In this model, a reduction in the minimum wage reduces the skill-bias of technology, since the inflow
from unemployment is mainly into the low-skilled sector. In future research I plan to test the robustness
of the results to different labour market structures. More specifically the low-skilled sector should
feature either monopsony or search frictions. In these scenarios the reduction of the minimum wage
does not affect unemployment to the same extent, but it still triggers an expansion of the high-skilled
labour force through the increase in the skill premium.
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A R&D
A.1 Probability of successful innovation for a given R&D firm
The Poisson arrival rate of innovation for all firms indexed by k = 1, 2, ... when spending zk units
on R&D is ηzk. Since Poisson processes are additive, the economy wide arrival rate of innovation is
η
∑∞
k=1 zk if
∑∞
k=1 zk ≡ z <∞. In this case the probability that there is at least one innovation until the
end of the period is: ∫ 1
0
−ηze−ηztdt = 1− e−ηz
I assume that once a firm has a successful innovation, that firm receives the patent and innovation on
that line is finished for that period. Then the probability that matters is the probability that a given firm
has the first innovation. The probability that firm k has the first innovation at time t is:
−ηzke−ηzkt(e−η(z−zk)t) = −ηzke−ηzt
The probability that firm k has the first successful innovation until the end of the period is just:
∫ 1
0
λzke
−ηztdt =
zk
z
(1− e−ηz)
Which is what I wanted to show.
A.2 Monopoly pricing
Lemma 2. If q > (1− β)− 1−ββ then at any moment in time only the best quality of any machine will be bought
at its monopoly price.
Proof. When the marginal cost of producing a machine of quality q1 is q1, then given the demand in
(5) the monopoly price of this machine is χ1 = q11−β . If an intermediate good producing firm uses this
machine his profit is:
pi1 = (p
s)
1
βNsq1
(
(1− β) 1−ββ −1 − (1− β) 1−ββ
)
If the firm instead uses a lower q2 = q1qk quality machine at the price of its marginal cost χ2 = q2, then
his profit is:
pi2 = (p
s)
1
βNsq1
(
1
qk
(1− β)−1 − 1
qk
)
If pi1 > pi2 for all k > 0 integers, then only the best quality of any machine will be bought in equilibrium
at its monopoly price.
The pi1 > pi2 condition is equivalent to:
(1− β) 1−ββ −1 − (1− β) 1−ββ > 1
qk
(1− β)−1 − 1
qk
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With some algebra we get that this is equivalent to:
qk > (1− β)− 1−ββ
Since the above holds for k = 1 and q > 1, it holds for all k ≥ 1.
B Steady State
B.1
Since the total size of the population is constant, both Nh∗ and N l∗ are constant along the BGP. The
supply of effective labour,Nh∗ andN l∗ can only be constant if the threshold abilities for unemployment,
al, ah and the optimal education decision e(a, c) for all a and c are constant. The cutoff abilities for
unemployment are defined by:
wt = a
lβ(1− β) 1−2ββ (pl∗t )
1
βQl∗t
wt = a
hβ(1− β) 1−2ββ (ph∗t )
1
βQh∗t
Hence along the steady state where both ah and al are constant
al
ah
ph∗t
pl∗t
− 1β
=
Qh∗t
Ql∗t
,
The relative price of the intermediate goods depends on the relative quality and the relative labour
supply in the two groups. Combining the above with (12) gives:
Qh∗t
Ql∗t
1− (1−ρ)
(1−(1−β)ρ)
=
al
ah
γ−
1
(1−(1−β)ρ)
(
Nh∗
N l∗
) (1−ρ)
(1−(1−β)ρ)
(29)
Since β 6= 0 the relative quality, Q∗t = Qh∗t /Ql∗t is constant in the steady state. This also immediately
implies that the relative price of the intermediates, p∗ = ph∗t /pl∗t is constant in the steady state. Since the
price of the final good is normalized to one, this also implies that ph∗ and pl∗ are constant.
If prices of intermediate goods are constant, and the supply of both types of effective labour is
constant, then from (6), the per period profit from owning a leading vintage of quality q is constant as
well. In the next section I show that constant period profits imply that steady state R&D investments
on a line j in sector s are independent of the quality of the leading vintage in that line.
B.2 R&D spending
Using that the steady state profits in sector s are constant:
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Lemma 3. The total R&D spending on any line for a given quality is constant along the BGP: zj,s∗t (q) =
zj,s∗t+T (q) = z
j,s∗(q) for all t, T ≥ 0.
Proof. The R&D spending on each line has to be either constant or growing at a constant rate along the
balanced growth path. This implies that the equilibrium total R&D spending on line j in sector s can
be written as: zj,s∗t+T (q) = γ
T zj,s∗t (q). Where γ > 0 is the growth rate of the R&D spending on line j in
sector s for a given quality q. In what follows I denote zj,s∗t (q) by zt. Conditional on quality q, the per
period profit is constant, pis∗q, since both Ns∗ and ps∗ are constant along the BGP. Iterating forward (7),
the value of owning the leading vintage on line j with quality q at time t+ T can be written as:
Vt+T (q) = qpi
s∗
∞∑
τ=0
e−ηztγ
T γτ−1
γ−1
(1 + r)τ
.
Given Vt+T (q) the equilibrium level of R&D spending is zt+T if (8) is satisfied:
1
1 + r
(Vt+T (q))
zt+T
(1− e−ηzt+T ) = q.
This has to hold for all T > 0, implying that
∑∞
k=0
e
−ηzt γ
k−1
γ−1
(1+r)k
(1− e−ηzt) =
1
γ
∑∞
k=0
e
−ηztγ γ
k−1
γ−1
(1+r)k
(1− e−ηztγ) = ...
1
γT
∑∞
k=0
e
−ηztγT γ
k−1
γ−1
(1+r)k
(1− e−ηztγT ).
To simplify notation denote ak ≡ γ
k−1
γ−1 and ηzt ≡ b. Since the above should hold for any T > 0,
this implies that the difference between two consecutive terms should be zero. Taking logarithm and
derivative with respect to T yields the following condition:
0 = ln γ
−1 +
 bγT e−bγT
1− e−bγT −
bγT
∑∞
k=0
ake
−bγT ak
(1+r)k∑∞
k=0
e−bγT ak
(1+r)k
 . (30)
This has to hold for all T > 0, even as T →∞. There are three cases: γ > 1, γ < 1 and γ = 1. For γ = 1
the above trivially holds for all T > 0.
For γ > 1 taking the limes yields:
limT→∞
 bγT e−bγT
1−e−bγT −
bγT
∑∞
k=0
ake
−bγT ak
(1+r)k∑∞
k=0
e−bγT ak
(1+r)k
 =
0− limT→∞
bγT
∑∞
k=0
ake
−bγT ak
(1+r)k∑∞
k=0
e−bγT ak
(1+r)k
< 0
Where the second term is non-negative, implying a negative value as T grows very large. Hence, for
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γ > 1 (30) does not hold for all T > 0.
For γ < 1 I will show that the second term in the brackets is strictly smaller than 1, except in the limit.
Denote x ≡ bγT , then as T →∞, x→ 0. The first term is smaller than 1 for any x > 0:
xe−x
1− e−x < 1⇔ e
−x(1 + x) < 1
For x = 0, e−x(1 + x) = 1. The derivative of the left hand side is −e−xx, which is negative for all x > 0,
implying that for any x > 0 the above inequality strictly holds.
The second term in the brackets is strictly positive for all T > 0 and finite. This implies that the term in
the brackets is strictly smaller than 1 for any finite T . Hence (30) does not hold for any T > 0.
Therefore in the steady state zj,s∗ is constant for a line with quality q. This also implies that the value
of owning the leading vintage with quality q in line j and sector s is constant in the steady state. Its
value can be expressed from iterating (7) forward and using the above lemma as:
V j,s∗t (q) =
qβ(1− β) 1−ββ (ps∗) 1βNs∗
1− e−ηzj,s∗(q)1+r
.
Note that the value of owning a leading vintage is proportional to its quality level. This observation
leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 1. In the steady state the total R&D spending on each line within a sector is constant and equal:
zj,s∗t = z
k,s∗
t+v = z
s∗ for all j, k ∈ s and all v ≥ 0.
Proof. Using (8) and the steady state value of owning a leading vintage, the total amount of R&D spend-
ing on line j in sector s with quality q is implicitly defined by:
β(1− β) 1−ββ (ps∗) 1βNs∗ = Bzj,s∗(q) (1 + r − e
−ηzj,s∗(q))
1− e−ηzj,s∗(q) .
The left hand side only depends on sector specific variables, hence the total amount of R&D spending
on improving line j in sector s is independent of the current highest quality, q on that line. Since it is only
the quality level that distinguishes the lines from each other within a sector the corollary follows.
B.3
Therefore, the total amount of R&D spending on each line within a sector is equal and constant over
time. This equilibrium R&D spending is given by (20). In the steady state zh∗ = zl∗ = z∗ and the growth
rate is g∗ = 1 + (q − 1)(1− e−ηz∗).
The price of the intermediates can be expressed from substituting the steady state relative price (21)
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into the intermediate good prices (2):
pl∗ =
1 + γ (Nh∗
N l∗
) βρ
1−ρ

1−ρ
ρ
(31)
ph∗ =
(Nh∗
N l∗
)− βρ1−ρ
+ γ

1−ρ
ρ
(32)
Using the steady state relative price and the steady state R&D investment:
Bz∗
(1 + r − e−ηz∗)
1− e−ηz∗ = β(1− β)
1−β
β
(
γNh∗
βρ
1−ρ +N l∗
βρ
1−ρ
) 1−ρ
βρ
(33)
The right hand side is the steady state per period profit from owning the leading vintage normal-
ized by the quality of the vintage. This profit is increasing in both Nh∗ and N l∗. If the labour supply
increases, then any unit of investment into R&D has a higher expected return, since there are more peo-
ple who are able to use it. This implies that the steady state R&D spending and the steady state growth
rate is increasing in the effective labour supplies.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. To see that al∗ and c∗ uniquely define ah∗ consider equation (25), making use of (23):
ah∗ = al∗γ−
1
1−ρ
(
N l∗
Nh∗
) βρ
1−ρ−1
.
Nh∗ is decreasing in ah∗. If βρ1−ρ − 1 < 0 then the right hand side is decreasing in ah∗, while the left hand
side is increasing, hence there is a unique ah∗ that satisfies the equation.
If βρ1−ρ − 1 > 0, then both the right and the left hand side is increasing in ah∗. The derivative of the left
hand side is 1, while the derivative of the right hand side is:
∂al∗γ−
1
1−ρ
(
N l∗
Nh∗
) βρ
1−ρ−1
∂ah∗
= ah∗
(
βρ
1− ρ − 1
) ((1− λ) ∫ c
c
(1− c)g(c)dc+ λ
)
ah∗f(ah∗)
Nh∗
.
The second two terms are smaller than one, and the first term is also smaller than one for any ah∗
that gives a sensible unemployment rate. This implies that in the region of interest there is a unique
solution.
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C Calibration
C.1 Ability and Cost Distribution
Given the assumptions on the distribution of a and c, and the thresholds al∗, ah∗ and c∗ the high- and
low-skilled effective labour supplies are:
Nh∗ =
(
(1− λ) ∫ c
0
(1− c)g(c)dc+ λ
) ∫ al∗
ah∗ af(a)da+ (34)(
(1− λ) ∫ c∗
0
(1− c)g(c)dc+ λG(c∗)
) ∫∞
al∗ af(a)da
N l∗ = (1−G(c∗))
∫ ∞
al∗
af(a)da (35)
Where f(·) is the probability density function of the ability distribution and G(·) is the cumulative
distribution function of the cost distribution. The above expressions account for the fact that those
members of the new generation who choose to acquire education only work 1 − c fraction of the first
period of their life.
Note that the effective supply of labour is not equivalent to the measure of high- and low-skilled
individuals, the difference being that the former counts the total ability available, while the latter counts
the number of people. The measure of high-skilled, low-skilled and unemployed is given by:
Lh∗ =
(
(1− λ) ∫ c
0
(1− c)g(c)dc+ λ
) ∫ al∗
ah∗ f(a)da+(
(1− λ) ∫ c∗
0
(1− c)g(c)dc+ λG(c∗)
)
G(c∗)
∫∞
al∗ f(a)da,
Ll∗ = (1−G(c∗)) ∫∞
al∗ f(a)da,
Lu∗ =
∫ al∗
0
f(a)da.
The cutoff ability of unemployment for the low-skilled is found by matching the fraction of unem-
ployed:
U =
∫ ah∗
0
f(a)da ⇔ ah∗ = e(σΦ−1(U)+µ) (36)
The cutoff time cost is found by matching the fraction of low-skilled:
Ll = (1−G(c∗))
∫ ∞
al∗
f(a)da, (37)
where al∗ satisfies (using (25)):
al∗ = ah∗
wh∗
wl∗
= ah∗
wh
wl
al
ah
,
and ah, al are the average abilities and wh, wl are the average wages in the two education groups. The
average ability in a sector is the ratio of the supply of efficiency units of labour to the supply of raw
labour in that sector: as = Ns/Ls. The supply of high- and low-skilled raw labour, Lh and Ll are
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observed from the data, but Nh and N l have to be calculated using (34).
This way for any cost and ability distribution al∗, ah∗ and c∗ is given as a function of the fraction of
unemployed and low-skilled workers. Finally note that the three thresholds and the parameters of the
ability and cost distribution are sufficient to calculate the average ability in both education groups.
C.2 Elasticity of Substitution
The consensus value is around 1.4 based on the paper by Katz and Murphy (1992). This original esti-
mate was based on 25 data points, and Goldin and Katz (2008) updated this estimate by including more
years and found an elasticity of 1.64. The estimating equation is:
log
wh
wl
= α1 + α2 log
H
L
. (38)
These estimates typically adjust for productivity differentials within a skill-group, but do not adjust for
differentials between skill groups. Hence the labour aggregates H and L are between the measure of
effective labour and raw labour. The parameter estimate α̂2 is interpreted as the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution between the two types of labour. I cannot use these estimates directly for several reasons.
First of all, the interpretation of α̂2 is different depending on the assumptions. To see this note that
the skill premium per efficiency unit can be expressed as
wh
wl
= γ
1
1−ρ
Nh
N l
βρ
1−ρ−1
,
along the balanced growth path, while it can be measured as
wh
wl
= γ
1
1−(1−β)ρ
(
Nh
N l
)− 1−ρ
1−(1−β)ρ (Qh
Ql
) βρ
1−(1−β)ρ
.
in the transition. Thereby, the interpretation along the BGP is α̂2 = βρ/(1 − ρ) − 1, while along the
transition it is α̂2 = −(1− ρ)/(1− (1− β)ρ). However, the estimate of α̂2 in the transition will be biased
due to the lack of a good measure of average quality in the two sectors. Second, as noted before, the
measure of labour supply aggregates used inKatz and Murphy (1992) are not the effective supply of
labour, which in the model determines wages. Moreover, the measure of skill premium is not the skill
premium per efficiency unit wh/wl of the model, it is probably closer to the average skill premium. Due
to these reasons, reinterpreting the implications of the value of α̂2 for ρ is not sufficient to use these
estimates in my calibration.
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D Transitional Dynamics
To use the Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe algorithm, all equations have to be defined in terms of variables
that are stationary in the steady state. Let vst denote the normalized value of owning the leading vintage
in sector s at time t:
vht =
V ht (q)
q v
l
t =
V lt (q)
q
Let ∆t denote the normalized present value gain per unit of effective labour from acquiring education
conditional on being employed in every future period (normalized by the current quality in the low-
skilled sector):
∆t =
∞∑
j=0
(
λ
1 + r
)j wht+j − wlt+j
Qlt
The equations that hold throughout the transition in terms of these normalized variables are:
vst+1 = B
(1+r)zs
1−e−ηzst s = l, h
vst = β(1− β)
1−β
β (pst )
1
βNst − e
−ηzst
1+r v
s
t+1 s = l, h
gst+1 = 1 + (q − 1)(1− e−ηz
s
t ) s = l, h
pht =
(
γ + γ
βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)(1−ρ)
(
Qt
Nht
N lt
)− βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
plt =
(
1 + γ1−
βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)(1−ρ)
(
Qt
Nht
N lt
) βρ
(1−(1−β)ρ)
) 1−ρ
ρ
w˜ = altβ(1− β)
1−2β
β (plt)
1
β
w˜ = aht β(1− β)
1−2β
β (pht )
1
βQt
Qt+1 =
ght+1
glt+1
Qt
∆t = c
∗
tβ(1− β)
1−2β
β (pht )
1
βQt
∆t = β(1− β)
1−2β
β
(
(pht )
1
βQt − (plt)
1
β
)
+ λ1+r
1
glt+1
∆t+1
Nht = λN
h
t−1
−λ(1− λ) c− c
2
2
c
∫ alt−1
aht−1
af(a)da
+λ(1− λ) ∫ alt−1
aht−1
af(a)da
−λ(1− λ) c
∗
t−1−
c∗t−12
2
c
∫∞
alt−1
af(a)da
+λ(1− λ) c
∗
t−1
c
∫∞
alt−1
af(a)da
+λ
c∗t−
c∗t 2
2
c
∫∞
alt
af(a)da
+λ
c− c22
c
∫ alt
aht
af(a)da
+λ(1− λ) ∫ aht−1
aht
af(a)da
N lt = λN
l
t−1 + (1− λ) c−c
∗
t
c
∫∞
alt
af(a)da
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E Decomposition
I denote the initial steady state by a subscript 0 and the new steady state by a subscript 1.
E.1 Exogenous education, exogenous technology
Since the total supply of high-skilled effective and raw labour is constant Nh∗0 = N l∗1 = Nh∗.
The equations that define the new steady state are:
N l∗1 =
∫ ah∗0
al∗1
af(a)da+N l∗0
Note that this adjustment only takes place if al∗1 < ah∗0 , that is if the decrease in w˜ is large enough. When
the change in the minimum wage is small, then the decline only implies that some people should not
get educated, because they would be productive enough even without acquiring skills. However, since
education is fixed, this would imply no adjustments in the economy.
al∗1 (p
l∗
1 )
1
β = w˜1
pl∗1 =
1 + γ1− βρ(1−ρ+βρ)(1−ρ) (Nh∗
N l∗1
) βρ
1−ρ+βρ
Q
βρ
1−ρ+βρ

1−ρ
ρ
where Q = Qh/Ql and Qs = 1β
∫ 1
0
(qs,j)
1
β (χs,j)
1−β
β dj. I do not explicitly model the pricing of the ma-
chines, I denote the price of a machine with quality qs in line j by χs,j . The assumption that technology
is exogenous boils down to having Qh and Ql growing at the same constant rate. If the pricing of
machines would follow monopoly pricing or competitive pricing, then this would be equivalent to a
constant growth rate in the quality of each line.
Since education and technology are fixed, the new steady state is reached in the moment of the an-
nouncement. The lower bound of unemployment for the low-skilled, which implies the adjustment in
the size of the low skilled labour force. The new skill premium is:
wh∗1
wl∗1
= γ
1
1−ρ+βρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗1
)− 1−ρ1−ρ+βρ
Q
βρ
1−ρ+βρ ,
which is higher than before.
E.2 Endogenous education, exogenous technology
The supply of high- and low-skilled workers in the new steady state are as in (34) and (35), while
through the transition they are governed by the same equations as in section D of the Appendix. The
threshold for low- and high-skilled unemployment are given exactly as in (25) and (24) (again the tran-
sition is as in section D of the Appendix, except for Qt = Q here, since technology is exogenous). The
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cutoff time cost for acquiring education is given by:
c∗ =
1− wl∗t
wh∗t
1− gλ1+r
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the economy. The skill premium is given by:
wh
wl
= γ
1
1−ρ+βρ
(
Nh∗
N l∗
)− 1−ρ1−ρ+βρ
Q
βρ
1−ρ+βρ .
The price of intermediates is given by:
ph∗t =
γ βρ(1−ρ+βρ)(1−ρ) (Nh∗t
N l∗t
) −βρ
1−ρ+βρ
Q
−βρ
1−ρ+βρ + γ

1−ρ
ρ
pl∗t =
1 + γ1− βρ(1−ρ+βρ)(1−ρ) (Nh∗t
N l∗t
) βρ
1−ρ+βρ
Q
βρ
1−ρ+βρ

1−ρ
ρ
It is straightforward that Lemma 1 applies in this setup as well. The only thing left to show is that the
two curves are both downward sloping, with the curve which gives al∗ for different values of c being
flatter. This curve is downward sloping as before: a higher c implies an increase in the fraction of high
skilled and a decrease in the fraction of low-skilled, implying an increase in pl∗t . This from (24) implies
a lower al∗. The other curve, which defines the optimal c∗ for any value of al is also downward sloping.
To see this, consider an increase in al, which increases the relative supply of skills, as al shifts up, the
population between ah and al get a bigger weight in the relative supply of skills. An increase in the
relative supply decreases the skill premium, which in turn decreases c∗.
E.3 Exogenous education, endogenous technology
The supply of high and low skilled workers evolves the same way as in section E.1 of the Appendix.
The main difference is that the intermediate price in the new steady state is given by:
pl∗1 =
1 + γ (Nh∗
N l∗1
) βρ
1−ρ

1−ρ
ρ
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